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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTH) \ 
This appeal * \ ras poui eel • > v ei ft c i n the I Itah Si lpre 
empowering this court to decide this matter under I IT v < CODF ANN, § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STAN DARD U b RE \ l 
Issue one: Whether the trial court properly granted the motion to enforce the 
settlement agreement and entry of bar order. 
Standard i i. n ' i , • ill ,* i IN .1 " ,n'«V m,i'»' • ' S"»> i'»dim*S\\ ' 866 
P.2d 581, 584 (Utah App. 1993). 
Issue two: Whether the trial court properly determined the legal effect of appellants' 
n 5. 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Ong Ml (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 
447, 455 (Utah 1993). 
Issue three; Whether the "trial court properly exercised its discretion to determine 'the 
ultimate rights of appellants and appellees as between themselves pursuant to the motion to 
enfoi. . *. 
Pursuant to, UTAH R. APP. P. 24(b), appellees are providing a statement of the issues because appellants have 
misstated the issues, and in at least one respect the appropriate standard of review. For example, appellants contend 
in issue 2, at page 2 of their brief, that an issue is whether "certain of the findings and conclusions in the Second 
Amended Order, as the same may affect the rights of appellants in claims against appellants (sic) and as objected to 
by appellants, supported (sic) by substantial and competent evidence?" They then, with reference to whether the 
court properly applied 11 U.S.C. § 365, contend that a correctness standard applies. This statement of the issue is 
far too broad and is not determined by a correctness standard. While conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, Ong Int'l, 850 P.2d at 455, factual findings are assessed based on a clearly erroneous standard. Alta 
Indus Ltd v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). 
1 
Standard of review: Abuse of discretion. UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(c)(1); Cheney v. Rucker, 
381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963); Boil v. Nation Union Fire Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 
1993). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The following statutes and rules are determinative of the issues on appeal. 
Rule 54(c¥n of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of 
several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate 
rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
11 U.S.C. § 365 (in relevant parf> 
(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c), 
and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any 
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor. 
(b)(1) If there has been a default in any executory contract or unexpired lease of the 
debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time of assumption of 
such contract or lease, the trustee— 
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly cure, such 
default; 
(B) compensate, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly 
compensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract or lease, for any actual 
pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such default; and 
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or 
lease. 
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default that is a breach of a 
provision relating to— 
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the 
closing of the case; 
2 
(B) the commencement of a case under this title: - * 
(C) the appointment of or taking possession bv ,*. trustee ;n 3 case under this title 
or a custodian before such commencement. 
l.LU,S,CJL349 
(a) Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, the dismissal of a case under this title 
does not bar the discharge, in a later case under this title, of debts that were dischargable in the 
case dismissed; nor does the dismissal of a case under this title prejudice the debtor with regard 
to the filing of a subsequent petition under this title, except as provided in section 109(f) of this 
title. 
(b) Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a case other than under 
section 742 of this title— 
(1) reinstates— 
• (A) any proceeding or custodianship superseded 'under section 543 of this/title; 
(B) any transfer avoided under section 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of 
this title, or preserved under section 510(c)(2), 522(i)(2), or 551 of this title; 
(2) vacates any order, judgment, or transfer ordered under section 522(i)(l), 542, 550, or 
553 of this title; and 
(3) revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such property was vested 
immediately before the commencement of the case under this title. 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E CASK 
Nature of the Case 
This was an action by joint venturers to recover for the breach of fiduciary duty 
cuiHA'niiojJi liiiiiiiill iiiiisiii.iina^criiiiil nil! ninl iiiiiiiii tui'l issils ill i IIIin In iippHLmls and unnHlees fm-
plaintiffs below) shared certain Interests at "the time the action was brought. iHy, 
appellees had, prior to becoming joint venturers with appellants, transferred the interests of a 
family partnership, EADAC Investment Company ("EADAC"), to a "trust. 
3 
Those interests consisted in the main of ownership interests in certain developed real 
properties-mostly apartment complexes. Appellants were not originally involved in any way 
with EADAC prior to the transfer of EADAC's assets to the trust. Appellants later became joint 
venturers with appellees for the sole purpose of recovering, renovating and otherwise salvaging 
the properties following mismanagement and waste by the trustees and their related entities. 
This litigation was part of that joint effort against the trust to recover either the properties or their 
respective values. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The complaint was filed on May 20, 1991 and included claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty, conversion, an accounting, mismanagement and injunctive relief, among others. An 
amended complaint was filed on July 11, 1991, adding additional claims for rescission and 
dissolution of the trust to which EADAC's assets had been transferred. A second amended 
complaint was filed on February 4, 1992, adding claims for breach of contract. The parties 
exchanged motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss. 
The issues on appeal have nothing to do with the merits of the case and arose late in the 
case after appellees had reached a settlement with defendants without the involvement of 
appellants. On December 22, 1993, appellees moved the court for approval of the settlement and 
the entry of a bar order preventing appellants from bringing any claims against the settling 
parties. The thrust of the motion was that the court enter an order to the effect that the settlement 
between appellee and defendants (defendants are not parties to this appeal) was a final resolution 
4 
of this case, including the interests of appellants. Ihat motion, including a notice of hearing set 
for December 23, 1993, was hand-delivered to counsel for appellants on December 2_. 
A hearing w as held :)i:i December 23 a nci appella nts w ere represented by cuun&ci. The 
court entered findings of feet, conclusions of law and an order on Decembc: 2~ ; n o " n a 
December 29, - rhe court entered an amended order. Appellants objei ._ o 
a * - . ,:viu, iyy*. A notice of hearing on the motion to amend was 
filed on Januar — * hearing was he'd -n January — '994, and the court ordered that 
the parties attenip
 : der concern ing the motion to 
approve the settlemwxi. «&Aw*;ment and entr> oi bar order. A second amended order was entered 
on March 4 *™A A - tice of appeal was filed on April 1, 1994. The appeal was poured over 
f * 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
The state::,. itullv oiii'iir! hut ditXitiill hi follow. 
The following are the ke> s on appeal. 
On April 22, 1991, appellees entered .'into a what the parties have come to refer to as a 
jiiniiii I limn .jgreeiiMiiil ill n lh? ' ? iili.itfini ,ts .'ulilcnilmn «1 I'll I | I in - purpose oi' the 
agreement was to enlist the aid of appellants in retrieving, improving and either managing or 
selling certain properties, some ml »• .Iiu.h were threatened mill uiivilosiui ilim lt-nl been 
Citations to the findings of fact are abbreviated FF, followed by 'the paragraph number of 'the second amended 
order. (R. 3386-91, attached as appendix 3. 
5 
mismanaged by the defendants (who are not parties to this appeal). This litigation was part of 
that joint effort to save those properties. (Tr. 67; FF 2.) 
On June 25, 1992, appellees brought an action against appellants in the 160th District 
Court of Dallas County, Texas, styled EADAC Investment Co., Angela M. Psarras and Earnest 
Psarras v. Federal Leasing, Inc. and Lewis Butcher, cause no. 92-7821 (the "Texas action"). (R. 
3226.) The crux of the Texas action was the ownership of one of the distressed properties 
covered by the joint venture agreement. Id; FF 4-5. Appellees obtained a judgment in the Texas 
action against appellants and another related entity on March 25, 1993, in the amount of $40,000. 
(R. 3195.) The trial court in the Texas action entered declaratory relief as follows: 
A. The April 22, 1991, agreement between Plaintiffs, Eadac 
Investment Company, Angela M. Psarras, and Defendants Federal Leasing, Inc. 
and Lewis Butcher (the "Agreement"), a copy of which is attached to this Order as 
Exhibit "A", is executory in nature and Defendants, Carnicero Dynasty 
Corporation, Federal Leasing, Inc. and Lewis Butcher, have no rights, legal or 
equitable to the following described real property situated in Dallas County, 
Texas: 
BEING ALL of Lot One, Block 8118 of the City of Dallas, Dallas County, 
Texas, being also known as the WENCO ADDITION, as recorded in 
Volume 68143, Page 2113 of the Deed Records of Dallas County, Texas, 
and commonly known as the Kingsley Park North Apartments (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Property"). 
B. The Notice of Interest in Real Property, a copy of which is attached 
to this Order as Exhibit "B" is a cloud upon Plaintiff Eadac Investment 
Company's title to the Property and does not create any interest in the Property in 
any of the Defendants. 
C. Any and all liens against the Property which are purportedly held 
by Defendant Carnicero Dynasty Corporation by virtue of an assignment from 
The Perm Mutual Life Insurance company, or otherwise are void. 
6 
D. The Agreement does not provide, by Itself or b> reference to some 
other existing writing, sufficient data or other means b> which the Property to be 
conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty. As a result, the Agreement 
is unenforceable as failing to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frai ids. 
E. Plaintiff Eadac Investment Company is the fee simple owner of the Property. 
(R 3194-95; addei ldi u n 5; I : F 6 | 
Immediately following the entr> of the judgmerr : < unst appellants in the Texas action, 
appellants filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy. (R. 3333, 3335: "he bankruptcy cases were later 
uiiiisolnt.itnl ! if i I1"" HUi Kill! illm lilt ^nnellees filed a motion in I he 
consolidated bankruptcy case under 11 IJ.S.C, § 365 to force appellants to either accept or reject 
the j oint venture agreement (-
By stipulation with appellees, appellants rejected the joint venture agreement on 
November 10, 1993, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365. (R. 3337-38; FF 8.) That stipulation provides 
i..* - •• s : 
EADAC Investment Company and Ernest and Angela Psarras (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "Psarrases") and Wendell Butcher and Federal Leasing 
Corporation (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Butcher") (Psarrases and 
Butcher are hereinafter collectively referred to as "Party" or the "Parties") hereby 
stipulate and agree as follows: 
RECITALS 
1 On or about April 22, 1991, Psarrases entered into an agreement 
with Federal Leasing the ("Agreement"). A copy of the Agreement is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A." 
2 y j ^ p^igg acknowledge that each Party asserts that the other Party 
i and breached the terms of the Agreement and that such alleged 
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defaults and breaches make it impossible for Butcher to assume the Agreement 
under 11 U.S.C. § 365. 
3. The Parties acknowledge that each Party asserts claims against the 
other Party arising out of the alleged defaults and breaches of the Agreement and 
that the Parties mutually dispute each other's claims. 
3.[sic] On July 26, 1993, Psarrases filed a their [sic] Motion to Compel 
Assumption Or Rejection Of Executory Contract (the "Motion"). The Motion 
was set for a hearing on November 10, 1993, at 3:00 p.m. 
4. To save both sides the time and expense of conducting a full 
hearing on the Motion, the parties hereby stipulate as follow: 
STIPULATION 
A. The Agreement is an executory contract that is rejected pursuant to 
11 U.S.C. § 365, effective November 10,1993. 
(R. 3337-38, addendum 6.) 
The bankruptcy court entered an order rejecting the executory contract on November 22, 
1993, stating that the joint venture agreement "is rejected pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365, effective 
November 10, 1993." (R. 3349; addendum 7; FF 8.) The bankruptcy case was ordered 
dismissed on December 20, 1993. (FF 9.) An order of dismissal was entered on January 18, 
1994. (R.3392.) 
Meanwhile, appellees had been able to negotiate a settlement of this litigation. On 
December 22, 1993, appellees filed a motion to approve the settlement and for the entry of a bar 
order. (R. 3223.) That motion was supported by a memorandum, and included as exhibits the 
joint venture agreement, the judgment from the Texas action and the stipulation to the rejection 
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of the agreement. (R. 3225-31.) A hearing on this motion was held first on December 23, 1993, 
(R. 3386), and again on January 14, 1994. (FF 10; Tr. 52.) 
On Tuesday, December 21, 1993, written notice was provided to Butcher and Federal 
Leasing of a December 23, 1993 Order to Show Cause hearing, which, by stipulation of the 
parties was subsequently continued. On Wednesday, December 22, Butcher and Federal Leasing 
were given further written notice of the December 23, 1993 hearing and of Plaintiffs' Motion. 
Furthermore, despite having left messages with Butcher's and Federal Leasing's counsel of the 
Motion and upcoming hearing beginning on Monday, December 20, 193, their counsel refused or 
otherwise failed to return Plaintiffs' counsel's call until after the hearing. Butcher and Federal 
Leasing received actual and adequate notice of the hearing at least 2 days prior to the December 
23, 1993 hearing. (FF 10.) 
Service of Plaintiffs' Motion and Notice of Hearing was not required upon Butcher and 
Federal Leasing because the Agreement was null and void as a result of the Final Summary 
Judgement in the Texas Case and the Stipulation and Order rejecting the Agreement, therefore 
leaving Butcher and Federal Leasing without rights and claims thereunder, including all claims 
set forth in this action. (FF 11.) 
At the December 23, 1993 Hearing, the Court granted Butcher and Federal Leasing until 
noon on Monday, December 27 to provide the Court with a written response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion. Neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing have filed any such written response. (FF 12.) 
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The trial court entered an order consistent with the motion on December 27, 1993. (R. 
3239-44; addendum 1.) The court then entered an amended order, along with an order 
dismissing the action on December 29, 1993. (R. 3251-52; addendum 2.) On January 10, 1994, 
appellants filed an objection to the order of December 27 and the amended order of December 
29, (R. 3265-69), and a hearing on the objection was set for January 14, 1994. (R. 3270-71; 
Tr. 52.) Paul Moxley, counsel for defendants, and David McGrath, counsel for appellees, each 
filed an affidavit in response to appellants1 objection. (R. 3274-83.) 
Following the hearing on January 14, 1994, appellees filed a post-hearing memorandum. 
(R. 3305-14.) This memorandum was objected to on February 1, 1994. (R.3371.) Appellants 
submitted proposed findings and conclusions and a proposed order on January 19, 1994. 
(R. 3358-62.) The trial court entered a second amended order on March 4, 1994. (R. 3386-91; 
addendum 3.) This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADJUDICATED THE ISSUES 
RAISED IN THE MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT AND 
ENTRY OF BAR ORDER 
A party need not plead every possible theory for a full resolution of the litigation in order 
for the trial court to grant that kind of relief. This is particularly true when, at the end of the 
litigation, the ultimate rights of co-parties need to be determined. The court may invoke its ever-
present equitable powers to adjust the rights of co-parties, or it may look to no further than rule 
54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for its authority. In this case, after appellants1 
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voluntary egress from the case by severing their relationship with appellees, a final resolution of 
the litigation required that the rights of the co-plaintiffs be determined. Although the motion 
giving rise to this appeal was not captioned as one under rule 54(c)(1), it nevertheless sought the 
relief that rule invites. There was no error in the court's adjudication on that score. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THE EFFECT OF 
APPELLANTS' REJECTION OF THE JOINT VENTURE 
AGREEMENT UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 365 
Rejection of an executory contract under 11 U.S.C. § 365 terminates the agreement and 
severs the contractual relationship between the parties. That termination is not undone by a 
dismissal of the bankruptcy case. Just as abandoned property is not revested on dismissal, 
neither is a rejected contract. Indeed, because an executory contract never becomes property of 
the estate until it is assumed, it cannot possibly revest if rejected. The trial court properly 
determined that appellants1 rejection of the joint venture agreement, a contract they admitted was 
"impossible" for them to assume, terminated the agreement and severed appellants from further 
interest in the litigation. Appellants practically stipulated to this outcome when they offered 
there own proposed findings and conclusions to that effect. 
III. APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN 
CHALLENGING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, THUS 
REQUIRING THIS COURT TO ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS OF 
THOSE FINDINGS 
Appellants venture a challenge to the trial court's findings of fact without first marshaling 
the evidence that supports those findings. This court is not expected to cull that evidence from 
11 
the record. Appellants must marshal or concede that the findings are correct. Here, they have 
failed to first argue against themselves in order to then demonstrate that the evidence fails to 
support the findings. Appellants compound their error by invoking an incorrect standard of 
review with respect to factual findings. The trial court's findings are accurate and have, at any 
rate, survived appellants' attack. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADJUDICATED THE ISSUES 
RAISED IN THE MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT AND 
ENTRY OF BAR ORDER 
The law favors the complete resolution of a dispute. See Penrod v. NuCreation Creme, 
Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983). The rules of civil procedure rest on a policy of substance over 
form, Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 457 (Utah App. 1991); Barlow v. Cappo, 821 P.2d 465, 
466-67 (Utah App. 1991), and deciding cases "on the merits rather than pleading technicalities." 
Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah 1989), citing Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp, 
Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 1983). 
For these reasons, "every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose 
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(c)(1). See also id. at rule 15(b)(failure to actually amend pleadings to 
conform to matters actually litigated does not affect the judgment on those matters). To that end, 
the judgment "may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the 
parties on each side as between or among themselves." UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(c)(1). 
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Required for rule 54(c)(1) to operate is only that the issue be raised in one form or 
another and addressed by the parties. Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 
735 (Utah 1984)(" Although Rule 54(c)(1) permits relief on grounds not pleaded, that rule does 
not go so far as to authorize the granting of relief on issues neither raised nor tried.") 
This requirement that the matters be raised, if not in the pleadings, then presumably by 
motion, avoids prejudice to an opposing party. Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 829 P.2d 117, 119-20 (Utah 
App. 1992) (rule 54(c)(1) applied to issue raised by motion). "If there is no prejudice, it is 
necessary only that the relief granted be supported by the evidence and be a permissible form of 
relief for the claims litigated." Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1263 (Utah 1987), quoted in 
Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 472 (Utah App. 1988). See Mabey v. Kay Peterson 
Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287, 290 (Utah 1984)(rule 54(c)(1) allows reformation of a document if 
mutual mistake is established, even though issue not raised and reformation not requested in 
pleadings).4 
Since the distinctions between courts of equity and law have been abolished, UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 2, the court may administer relief according to the nature of the cause before it. Wasatch 
Oil Refining Co. v. Wade, 63 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1936). The rules, as already indicated, "must all 
3
 Utah's rule 54(c)(1) is identical to FED. R. Crv. P. 54(c), except that Utah has added the last sentence concerning 
"the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves." 
Combe, the decision in this area most often cited, is an example of what not to do. There, the trial court ignored 
the pleadings, and despite the absence of any motions, entered findings "from whole cloth" and a judgment no one 
had even contemplated. 680 P.2d at 735. The issue on which the court renders a decision must be raised in some 
fashion. "It is error," the court held, "to adjudicate issues not raised before or during trial and unsupported by the 
record." Id. at 736. In Combe, as in this case, the trial court's findings were objected to "on the ground that they 
went beyond the issues pleaded, tried and proved." 680 P.2d at 735. See Appellant's Brief at 20, et seq. 
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be looked to in the light of their even more fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading 
and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever 
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute." Cheney, 381 P.2d at 91. 
With total resolution as the objective, the parties' participation in the court's effort is the 
prerequisite: 
What they are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet 
them. When this is accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules provide 
for liberality to allow examination into and settlement of all issues bearing upon 
the controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other party to have a reasonable 
time to meet a new issue if he so requests. Rule 15(b) . . . so states. It further 
allows for an amendment to conform to the proof after trial or even after 
judgment, and indicates that if the ends of justice so require, "failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues." This idea is confirmed by 
Rule 54(c)(1) . . . .: "[Ejvery final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded 
such relief in his pleadings." 
Cheney, 381 P.2d at 91 (footnote omitted) (quoting UTAH R. Civ P. 54(c)(1)). 
In Evans Products Co. v. West American Ins. Co., 736 P.2d 920 (3d. Cir. 1984), the court 
held that relief not requested in the pleadings may nevertheless be awarded if the parties either 
explicitly or implicitly consented to litigate the issue. See also Kaszuk v. Bakery & 
Confectionery Union, 791 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1986)(affirming summary judgment granting relief 
neither pled nor specifically requested by motion—failure to amend did not preclude relief 
requested late in the action). Cf Cioffe v. Morris, 676 F.2d 539 (11th Cir. 1982). 
These rules, designed to end the dispute altogether, are rooted in ancient notions of 
equity, and this is particularly true since the combining of actions at law and at equity. 
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1 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 242, at 456 (5th ed. 1941).5 The objective is that the 
parties will never have to meet in court again on a matter related to the one that brought them 
there in the first place. 
It has elsewhere been observed (see § 114) that the governing motive of equity in 
the administration of its remedial system is to grant foil relief, and to adjust in the 
one suit the rights and duties of all parties, which really grow out of or are 
connected with the subject-matter of that suit. It will readily be seen that this is 
another example of the operation of the doctrine that equity, where possible, will 
afford complete relief. 
POMEROY'S, § 239a., at 449.7 
5
 There is, according to POMEROY'S a "fundamental conception" that a court will "strive to determine the entire 
controversy, to award full and final relief, to do complete justice to all the litigants, whatever might be the amount 
or nature of their interest..." This concept has become engrafted into the new rules: 
This same grand principle is one of the fundamental and essential thoughts embodied in the 
"reformed system of procedure," which first appeared in 1848, in the New York Code of Civil 
Procedure, has since extended through so many states and territories of this country and colonies 
of Great Britain, and was substantially adopted for England in the "Supreme Court of Judicature 
Acts." That system of procedure, by combining the actions at law and suits in equity into one 
"civil action," by permitting the union of legal and equitable primary rights, and interests, and 
causes of action in the one judicial proceeding, and the granting of legal and equitable remedies in 
the one judgment, and by the substitution of many equity rules concerning the prosecution of suits 
in place of the arbitrary rules of the law regulating the conduct of actions, has greatly enlarged the 
operation and increased the efficiency of the general doctrine under discussion. 
POMEROY'S, § 242, at 456. 
6
 The principle of res judicata is based on this very notion. See Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 
1990); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). 
In the footnote to this passage, the author cites to other cases in which the court, having decided the main dispute 
between plaintiff and defendant, also decided the ultimate resolution between the co-plaintiffs. In Moss v. Thomas, 
117 So. 648 (Ala. 1928), the main dispute concerned specific performance of a real estate sales contract, and the 
court also resolved the issue of the commission owed to the broker by the vendor. Similarly, the court in Oelrichs v. 
Spain, 15 Wall. (U.S.) 211 (1872) decided what plaintiffs as a group were owed on certain bonds, and then also 
decided the shares owed to each plaintiff. See also Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 248 P. 329 (Okl. 1926). 
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A. The trial court's decision to adjudicate the rights of appellants and 
appellees concerning the settlement was a proper exercise of its equity 
powers. 
A trial court's equitable powers are malleable, freeing the court's hand to fashion a 
remedy according to the particular case before it. See Williamson v. Wanless, 545 P.2d 1145, 
1148 (Utah 1976). The court's freedom in this regard is limited only by the notions of "fairness 
and good conscience." Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976). In Williamson, 
the court outlined the broad contours of equitable relief: 
The rules of equity arose as a means of avoiding or ameliorating the rigidities and 
harshness of some of the rules and remedies of law . . . . The principles of equity 
and justice are universal; they apply whenever appropriate and necessary to 
enforce rights or to prevent oppression or unjustice. 
545P.2datll48.8 
Equity thus allows the court "to recognize new and expanding remedies to meet new 
situations." Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 300 P.2d 726, 728 (Cal. App. 1956), cert, denied, 352 U.S. 
971 (1956). Part of a court's equity jurisdiction is the complete adjudication of all matters 
between the parties "to accomplish full justice so as to prevent further litigation." Helman v. 
Patterson, 241 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah 1952). See also Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 225 P.2d 
739, 748-49 (Utah 1950) (court should decide all legal and equitable issues in a dispute when 
given an opportunity to do so); Fletcher v. Security Pacific National Bank 591 P.2d 51, 58 (Cal. 
The only limitation on the court's exercise of its equitable powers appears to be in the reformation of contracts, 
where its "powers are narrowly bounded." Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985). In an action for 
reformation, when courts are understandably "reluctant to change contractual obligations and rights," id, the court 
may not "rewrite a contract to include terms never contemplated by the parties." Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 
P.2d 549, 552 (Utah 1984). There are no such limitations on the court's equitable powers in this case. 
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1979) "A court of equity may exercise its full range of powers in order to accomplish complete 
justice between the parties . . . .") 
Indeed, by definition, the court's equity powers are never limited by precedent. Farrell v. 
Placer County, 145 P.2d 570, 572 (Cal. 1944). Equity has always been outside such restraints: 
Equity does not wait upon precedent which exactly squares with the facts in 
controversy, but will assert itself in those situations where right and justice would 
be defeated by for its intervention. "It has always been the pride of courts of 
equity that they will so mold and adjust their decrees as to award substantial 
justice according to the requirements of the varying complications that may be 
presented to them for adjudication." 
Id (quoting Humboldt Savings Bank v. McCleverty, 119 P. 82 (Cal. 1936). See also Sauer v. 
Moffitt, 363 N.W. 269, 274 (Iowa App. 1984) (court "will devise a remedy to meet the situation 
though no similar relief has been granted before"). 
In this case, appellees sought nothing more than a final determination of their rights vis-a-
vis appellants. The fact that they were once allies in the litigation is unimportant because rule 
54(c)(1) expressly invites the court to resolve the predictable disputes that can arise between co-
parties. Appellees wanted an end to this case-an end to their tortuous relationship with 
appellants. Exercising its equity powers, the trial court granted just that. Although appellees did 
not style their motion as one under rule 54(c)(1), that is clearly the substance of the relief they 
were seeking. (R. 3230; Tr. 11.) "The title of a motion is not dispositive as to whether a court 
9
 Equity was born anciently precisely because of the limiting aspects of the king's writs. "[T]his failure led to the 
origin and growth of the competing-and complimentary-system of equity." R. THOMPSON & J. SEBERT, 
REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND RESTITUTION, § 3.01, 3-5 (1983). Now, of course, the distinctions between the 
notions of law and equity are abolished as those distinctions once required different courts. See UTAH R. Civ. P. 2; 
Marlowe Investment Corp. v. Radmall, 485 P.2d 1402 (Utah 1971); Williamson, 545 P.2d at 1148. 
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can grant relief under the motion." Kunzler v. O'dell, 855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1993). See 
also, Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1991); Darrington, 812 
P.2d at 457 (court will not elevate form over substance in granting relief requested by motion). 
Appellants' only connection to this case was the joint venture agreement, an agreement a 
Texas court had already determined had been breached. (R. 3329-31.) Appellants merely 
broadened that breach when they rejected the contract under § 365. (See section II, infra.) The 
trial court simply took these facts and resolved, because "the justice of the case require[d] it," 
"the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves." UTAH R. CIV. 
P. 54 (c)(1). There was no error in doing so. 
B. Appellants were not denied due process relative to the court9s grant of 
the motion to approve the settlement and enter the bar order. 
Due process "requires that litigants have their day in court." Copper State Thrift and 
Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 391 (Utah App. 1987). "For purposes of due process, the parties 
must receive notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise them of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Id, citing 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
In Bruno, a due process challenge was defeated because there was in fact adequate notice-
-evidenced by appearance at the subject hearing. Full participation in the litigation giving rise to 
the order from which the appeal is taken defeats a due process attack on that litigation. Id. See 
also Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n., 657 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 1982). 
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Appellants here lace their argument with references to their due process rights. (See 
appellants' brief at 20.) Like the appellant in Bruno, appellants here received notice of the 
hearing and the pendency of the motion and actually appeared to make their objections known. 
(Tr. 3, 5.) Moreover, appellants succeeded in obtaining a second hearing (Tr. 52), and filed 
objections to the court's orders. Appellants ultimately obtained three modifications to the order 
from which this appeal is taken. (Cf addenda 1, 2 and 3.) Appellants can hardly complain now 
that they were left out of the proceedings. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE EFFECT 
OF APPELLANTS' REJECTION OF THE JOINT VENTURE 
AGREEMENT UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 365 
A chapter 11 debtor may reject an executory contract deemed burdensome or not 
beneficial to the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 365.10 "[Rejection [under § 365] constitutes a breach 
immediately before the date of the filing of the petition. [T]he effect of rejection is that a breach 
is deemed to exist which in the ordinary case will give rise to a claim for damages." 2 COLLIER 
ON BANKRUPTCY, f 365.03, at 365-18, -19, f 365.08, at 365-54 (15th ed. 1994). See also In re 
Western Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592, 595 (10th Cir. 1990); BSL Operating Corp. v. 125 
East Taverns, Inc., 57 B.R. 945 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).11 
A debtor in a chapter 11 case is under 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) the equivalent of a trustee. 
11
 An executory contract is generally one "on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides." 
2 COLLIER, % 365.02. Appellants stipulated that the joint venture agreement was an executory contract. (R. 3338). 
Rejection can also be treated as an abandonment of the contract by the debtor. Id at 365-55. Under 11 U.S.C. § 
554, abandoned property is no longer property of the estate: 
Under section 541, the trustee no longer takes title to the debtor's property, and, upon 
abandonment under section 554, the trustee is simply divested of control of the property because it 
is no longer part of the estate. Thus, abandonment constitutes a divestiture of all interests in 
19 
Section 365's significance is that, unlike the presumption that the property of the debtor 
becomes the property of the estate, the only "property" that passes when an executory contract is 
involved is the right to assume or reject. In re Lovitt, 757 F.2d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied sub nom., Cheadle v. Appleatchee Riders Ass'n., 474 U.S. 849 (1985). The court in Lovitt 
observed as follows: 
Because executory contracts and leases involve future liabilities as well as 
rights, . . . an affirmative act of assumption by the trustee is required to bring the 
property into the estate in order to ensure that the estate is not charged with the 
liabilities except upon due deliberation. Thus, executory contracts and leases-
unlike all other assets-do not vest in the trustee as of the date of the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition. They vest only upon the trustee's timely and affirmative act 
of assumption. 
Because rejection of an executory contract is retroactive to the date of the 
filing of the petition, such a contract never becomes a part of the bankrupt's estate. 
Id, citing 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY f 70.43[1], at 516-17, 520 (14th ed. 1978); In re Frazin, 
183 F. 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1910). See also Bordewieck & Countryman, The Rejection of Collective 
Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293, 303 n. 31 (1983).12 
property that were property of the estate. [Property may be abandoned to any party with a 
possessory interest in it 
COLLIER, t 554.02[2] (footnotes omitted). See also Leasing Serv. Corp. v. First Term. Bank Nat, 826 F.2d 434, 437 
n.2(6thCir. 1987). 
12
 Bordewieck & Countryman state as follows: 
Were it not for § 365, all contracts and leases in which the debtor had a legal or equitable 
prepetition interest would become property of the estate under § 541(aXl). Perhaps § 365 should 
be viewed as a limitation on § 541(aXO giving the debtor, subject to court approval, an option to 
decide whether executory contracts and unexpired leases should become property of the estate. If 
they are rejected, they do not become property of the estate 
Bordewieck & Countryman at 303. 
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In In re Qintex Entertainment, Inc., 950 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1991), the court observed this 
rule, which finds its roots in legal antiquity.13 The court stated that M[a]n executory contract does 
not become an asset of the estate until it is assumed pursuant to § 365 of the Code." See also In 
re TleeU 876 F.2d 769, 770 (9th Cir. 1989)("Unless and until rights under an executory contract 
are timely and affirmatively assumed by the trustee, they do not become property of the debtor's 
estate.")14 
An executory contract, once rejected, does not revest in the debtor 
upon dismissal 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this exception created by the right to reject a 
contract under § 365: 
The debtor's filing bankruptcy creates a bankruptcy estate, (comprised 
with certain exceptions) of all the debtor's property and interests in property. This 
estate is administered by a fiduciary representative, the "trustee," and is 
considered a separate legal entity from the debtor. Under the Code, the debtor's 
property automatically passes to the estate to be governed by the trustee. 
However, section 365 of the Code creates an exception to the rule that a debtor's 
property automatically passes to the estate. Under section 365, executory 
contracts do not automatically vest in the estate, but enter it only upon assumption 
by the trustee. 
Cobabe v. Stanger, 844 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1992) (footnotes omitted); citing, et al, Lovitt, 757 
F.2d at 1041; In re Tortry, 724 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Cochise College Park Inc., 
13
 Though rooted in quaint notions of title, the idea is to give the trustee or the debtor in possession the option of 
whether to remain a party to a given contract, which is consistent with the preservative purposes of the bankruptcy 
act. See M. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection11 59 U.COLO. L.REV. 845 
(1988), particularly the discussion concerning Copelandv. Stephens, 106 ENG. REP. 218 (K.B. 1818). 
14
 The search for a definition, or better, a description of an executory contract has not been easy. See Matter of 
Executive Technology Data Systems, 79 B.R. 276,280 n.5 (Bkrtcy. E.D.Mich. 1987); In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 54-61 
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703 F.2d 1339, 1352 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Noonan, 17 B.R. 793, 797 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y. 1982); 2 
COLLIER, § 365.03; M. Andrew at 860-63 & n.76. 
At issue in Cobabe was the effect of rejection on "the rights and obligations of the parties 
to an executory contract for personal services." 844 P.2d at 301. There, however, the debtor, 
despite the trustee's rejection, remained always "ready, willing and able to perform" under the 
agreement. Id. at 302. Although ordinarily a rejection under § 365 constitutes a breach, Western 
Real Estate Fund, 922 F.2d at 595, that is not so when the contract is for personal services and 
the Chapter 7 debtor remains capable and willing to perform. Cobabe, 844 P.2d at 302. 
Rejection has several consequences. It is a breach, 11 U.S.C. § 365(g); it terminates the 
agreement, R and O Elevator Co. v. Harmon, 93 B.R. 667, 671 (D.Minn. 1988) ("Rejection . . . 
terminates the obligation of the parties under the contract."); and, except for the nondebtor's 
claim for breach, effectively ends the relationship between the parties. 
Rejection denies the right of the contracting creditor to require the debtor to 
perform the executory portions of the contract; limits the creditors claim to 
damage for breach of contract, and prohibits a rejecting debtor from compelling 
the contracting creditor to perform the executory obligations. 
In re Rudaw/Empirical Software Prod. Ltd, 83 B.R. 241, 246 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y. 1988), 
citing LeasingServ. Corp., 826 F.2d at 436. 
(Bkrtcy. D. Utah 1982). As happened in Executive Technology, this court need not join that search because the 
parties stipulated that the agreement was executory. (R. 3337-38.) See 79 B.R. at 280-81 n.5. 
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 This distinction, the court noted, is consistent with "the history and purpose of the Bankruptcy Act. Congress 
could not have intended the inequities that would result if we were to allow the nondebtor party to a personal 
services contract to abandon it or terminate it merely because the debtor party filed bankruptcy. The purpose of our 
bankruptcy law is to give the debtor a fresh start." Cobabe, 844 P.2d at 302, citing Noonan, 17 B.R. at 800 {citing 
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Rejection is not rescission, and does not "undo performances by the parties . . . which 
have preceded the assumption or rejection. In re Metro Transp. Co., 87 B.R. 338, 343 (Bkrtcy. 
E.D.Pa. 1988). "Property acquired prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy remains property 
of the estate regardless of whether the trustee or debtor in possession assumes or rejects the 
unperformed obligations of the contract pursuant to which the property was acquired." Executive 
Technology, 79 B.R. at 282. 
Dismissal of a case under § 349 operates ordinarily to restore the debtor to the status quo 
ante, as though the case had never been brought. In re Lewis & Coulter, Inc., 159 B.R. 188 
(Bkrtcy. W.D. Pa. 1993). Property rights are revested with the debtor upon dismissal. In re 
Ethington, 150 B.R. 48 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 1993). Dismissal revests only "the property of the 
estate in the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of 
the case under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 349 (b)(3). 
"[T]he courts have refused to extend the reinstatement effect of section 349(b) beyond its 
expressly enumerated provision." 2 COLLIER, § 349-11. See also Norton v. Hoxie State Bank, 61 
B.R. 258, 260 (Bkrtcy. D. Kan. 1989) ("section 349(b)(2) affects only the specific actions 
delineated in that subsection.") The Utah Supreme Court's decision in First Security Bank of 
Utah v. Creech, 858 P.2d 958 (Utah 1993) touches on but does not really address the issue in this 
case created by appellants1 § 365 rejection. In Creech, the bank attempted to enforce an "ipso 
facto" clause of a loan agreement, which provided that "the bank could hold the Creeches in 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 125 (1977), U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 1978, 5787, 5963; Perez v. 
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default, accelerate their monthly payments, and take immediate possession of the collateral if 
they filed for bankruptcy." Creech, 858 P.2d at 961. 
At issue was the bank's contention that the Creeches defaulted under the loan agreements 
upon filing bankruptcy. Id. at 963. The court held that there was no default because the ipso 
facto clause was unenforceable. Id. at 964. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B). There was no issue of 
rejection in Creech. The debtors had negotiated new terms with the bank, which were then 
incorporated into the plan of reorganization. Id. at 961. The default did not occur until post-
petition. 858 P.2d at 968 (Howe, J. dissenting in part). Even Creech, however, recognizes 
several exceptions to the rule concerning revesting under § 349. Id. at 964-65. 
The court also noted, consistent with Cobabe, that "[sjection 349(b)(3) affects only 
property of the estate." Creech, 858 P.2d at 966 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3)). Cf. In re 
Polysat, Inc., 28 C.B.C.2d 1157, 1162 (Bkrtcy. E. D. Pa. 1993) (observing that unless rejected an 
executory contract "continues in effect"), citing Smith v. Hill, 317 F.2d 539, 542 N.6 (9th Cir. 
1963) (quoting 8 COLLIER, at 162 (14th ed.) 
Appellants1 argument has already been rejected in BSL Operating, 57 B.R. 945. There, 
the debtor argued that a lease it had rejected under § 365 was revested upon dismissal under 
§ 349. The court noted that the purpose of § 349 "is to restore all property rights, as far as 
practicable, to the positions they occupied at the commencement of a case that was dismissed 
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971); Watson v. Merrill, 136 F. 359, 363 (8th Cir. 1905). 
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under one of the operative sections of title 11." Id. at 952 (emphasis in original) (quoting 2 
COLLIER § 349.03, at 349-8. 
The debtor's effort to undo its rejection, however, stretched § 349 too far. The court 
refused to permit the debtor to select which sections of the bankruptcy code would apply. 
"Having availed itself of the protection offered by the Code and the automatic stay by filing the 
1984 case, [debtor] cannot now . . . complain because the operation of other Code provisions and 
its own inaction resulted in the loss of the lease." Id, at 952. 
The court held as follows: 
[S]ection 349(b) lists the Code sections whose operative impact is specifically 
undone unless the court orders otherwise. Thus dismissal under section 349(b) 
reinstates in itemized fashion: proceedings or custodianships that were 
superseded by the bankruptcy case; avoided transfers; voided liens; vacates any 
order, judgment or transfer ordered as a result of the avoidance of a transfer; and 
revests the property of the estate in the entity in which the property was vested at 
the commencement of the case. Id. Section 365 is not one of the enumerated 
sections affected by a section 349(b) dismissal. 
Construing section 349 as Taverns would have this court do would utterly 
defeat the intent of section 365(d)(4). The two sections must be harmonized so 
that one provision does not annul the other. In light of the flexibility inherent in 
section 349, section 365(dX4) must be given effect in such a way as to prevent a 
lessee's bankruptcy from holding a nondebtor lessor hostage to repeated filings. 
BSL Operating Corp., 57 B.R. at 952. 
Likewise, In re Searle, 70 B.R. 266 (D.R.I. 1987), assessed the reach of § 349's revesting 
element. The question there was whether revesting "applies only to property remaining in the 
bankruptcy estate at the time of dismissal, or whether it also applies to property that has been 
distributed to creditors prior to dismissal." Id. at 270. It was argued that § 349 prevented the 
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enforcement of a consent order under which the debtor, prior to dismissal, had been making 
certain payments for real property. 
The court rejected that argument because of the rights already acquired and relied on the 
bankruptcy case itself: 
The few cases that mention subsection 349(b)(3) refer to its applicability only in 
the context of property or property rights that have not passed out of the 
bankruptcy estates. See In re Nash, 765 F.2d 1410, 1414 (9th Cir. 1985) (Wage 
deductions received by Trustee before dismissal revest in debtor/wage-earner after 
dismissal.); In re Groves, 27 B.R. 866 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) (Security interest in 
undischarged debts revests in creditor after dismissal.); In re Beasley, 22 B.R. 
773, n.l (Bankr.W.D. Tenn. 1982) (Debtor's mortgaged residence revests in 
debtor subject to mortgage after dismissal.). These cases suggest that the 
"property of the estate" that revests in its prior owners after dismissal includes 
only the property left in the estate at the time of dismissal. This view is reinforced 
by the legislative history of subsection 349(b). In a brief discussion of 349(b)'s 
impact on property that has passed out of the estate prior to dismissal, the 
legislative history states, "[wjhere there is a question over the scope of the 
subsection, the court will make the appropriate order to protect rights acquired in 
reliance on the bankruptcy case." S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5835. 
These considerations lead me to conclude that neither subsection 349(b)(2) 
nor 349(b)(3) deprives a Consent Order of its binding effect following dismissal 
of the bankruptcy case. 
Sear/e,70B.R.at271. 
More than having already passed out of the estate, an executory contract ultimately 
rejected never becomes part of the estate. Cobabe, 844 P.2d at 301. Appellants misread § 349 
(and never address whether and how it squares with § 365). Appellants argue that they may file 
for bankruptcy protection, enjoy the benefits of relief from creditors for nine months, stipulate 
that it is "impossible" for them to assume the agreement (R. 3337), and then, when it is 
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convenient, dismiss the bankruptcy case and pretend the stipulation, the rejection and the case 
itself never happened. Section 349 does not work that way. See, e.g., In re Bernard, 69 B.R. 13, 
14-15 (Bkrtcy. D.Haw. 1986) (a determination that a lease survives rejection frustrates the 
purpose behind § 365(d)(4). 
Moreover, a debtor may not assume an executory contract unless it can satisfy three 
statutory requirements: (1) the debtor must cure or provide adequate assurance that the default 
will be cured; (2) compensate or adequately assure compensation for the default; and (3) provide 
adequate assurance of future performance under the contract 11 U.S.C § 365(b)(l)(A)-(C). 
When appellants stipulated that it was "impossible" to assume the joint venture agreement, they 
stipulated that it was impossible to cure the existing defaults, impossible to compensate appellees 
and impossible to provide assurance of future performance The agreement was terminated. 
Harmon, 93 B.R. at 671. Appellants1 rejection of the joint venture agreement mercifully ended 
their relationship with appellees. The trial court's ruling in that regard, therefore, was correct. 
(R. 3390) ("Butcher's and Federal Leasing's rejection of the Agreement. . . operated as a matter 
of law to terminate the Agreement") 
Appellees merely invoked the trial court's ever-present power to fully resolve a lawsuit by 
determining "the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves." 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(c)(1). Based on a motion properly brought by appellees, the court was asked 
to determine the relationship between co-plaintiffs based on the only link between them-the 
joint venture agreement (R. 3366, f 1.) The court determined that appellant's rejection of the 
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agreement severed them from this litigation, and thus from any participation in the settlement. 
(FF 2-6.) 
The trial court also had the benefit of the judgment in the Texas action, where appellant's 
rights under the agreement were litigated. The Texas court found that the joint venture 
agreement was executory and otherwise unenforceable. (R. 3329-31.) Finally, the trial court had 
the benefit of appellants' own proposed findings and conclusions in which they essentially 
stipulated to the very result they now appeal. Appellants proposed as follows: 
The involvement of Wendell Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing, Inc., in the 
above lawsuit and their respective claims alleged in the pleadings arise out of an 
agreement dated April 22, 1991 with other parties in this lawsuit, which 
agreement by Stipulation and Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court, has 
been rejected and said contract has been determined by said Court to be non-
executory and Wendell Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing, Inc. have, therefore, 
no longer any right to assert any interest or claims in the proceedings now 
pending before this court. 
(R. 3365.) (Cf. Conclusions of Law at If 3-5.)16 
III. APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN 
CHALLENGING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, THUS 
REQUIRING THIS COURT TO ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS OF 
THOSE FINDINGS. 
A trial court's findings of fact enjoy a resumption of correctness and "will not be 
overturned unless . . . clearly erroneous." College Irr. Co. v. Logan R. & Blacksmith Fork Irr. 
Co., 780 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1989). To overcome this presumption, an appellant must 
Appellants challenge one of the trial court's findings on the basis that it is "misleading." (Appellants' Brief at 
35.) An appeal is not the time in which to argue for a modification to a finding of fact. Appellants should have 
sought an amendment under rule 52(b). In any event, the finding that an opportunity to respond in writing was 
granted and declined is correct. (Tr. 47-50.) (See FF 12.) 
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"marshal all of the evidence in support of the findings of the trial court and . . . then demonstrate 
that even when viewed in the light most favorable to the factual determination of the trial court, 
the evidence is insufficient to support its findings." Id. 
A challenge to a trial court's factual findings caries a "heavy burden"; when that burden is 
"not properly discharged, [the appellate court will] refuse to consider the merits of challenges to 
the findings and [will] accept the findings as valid." Mountain States Broadcasting, 783 P.2d at 
553. See also College Irr. Co., 780 P.2d at 1244 (failure to marshal is "in and of itself, 
dispositive of [the] challenges to the trial court's findings of fact.") 
After acknowledging an appellant's burden on appeal, the court in Doelle refused to 
disturb the trial court's findings because the appellant's brief presented "the conflicting evidence 
in a light most favorable to his position and largely ignorefd] the contrary evidence." Doelle, at 
1178. This court reached a similar result in Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 
1989). 
Marchant involved the appellant's claim to a prescriptive easement, which had been 
denied by the trial court. On appeal, the appellant failed to marshal the evidence supporting the 
court's finding, arguing instead that the finding was not supported by the evidence. Id. at 682. 
Accord Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991); 
Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah App. 1990); Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 
P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989), reWg denied. 
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The court refused to consider such "conclusory arguments without citation to either the record or 
cases involving pivotal issues." Id. 
Appellants here offer a challenge to the trial court's findings of fact at page 25 of their 
brief They then urge this court to apply a "substantial and competent evidence" test to that 
challenge-using a Kansas supreme court case as authority. A trial court's findings of fact are 
reviewed based on a standard of clear error. Alta Indus., 846 P.2d at 1286. Rule 52(a) provides 
in this regard that "[fjindings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous " 
There was much more before the trial court than the Texas judgment and the § 365 
rejection stipulation. The transcript of the two hearings, for example, contains numerous proffers 
and references to evidence the trial court considered in making its findings. See, e.g., Tr. at 44.) 
Using an incorrect standard to attack the trial court's findings, appellants have failed to marshal. 
Therefore, the findings are presumed true. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court, at the end of a complex and bitterly disputed case, and at the instance of 
appellees, merely determined the ultimate rights of co-plaintiffs with respect to the subject matter 
of the litigation. The trial court concluded correctly that appellants had essentially abandoned 
18
 Marchant also observed that an appellant's duty to marshal the evidence is essentially two-fold: the appellant 
must marshal all the evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate the insufficiency of that evidence. The 
appellant must also "marshal evidence which would support each element required to prove their claim of 
prescriptive easement." Id. at 682. The court's refusal to upset the trial court's findings was apparently based on the 
appellant's failure to accomplish either of these tasks. 
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the case and that the settlement between appellees and defendants ended this matter among all of 
the parties. Whether the trial court acted properly is not decided based on whether an 
amendment of the pleadings was required-it clearly was not. Finally, in wrapping up this 
litigation as it did, the trial court made several factual findings, now ostensibly challenged on 
appeal. Without first marshaling the evidence to support those findings, however, appellants' 
attack is repulsed before it begins. 
This court should affirm the trial court's order. 
DATED this S day of January, 1995. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
DAVID C. WRIGHT 1 
Attorneys for Appellees / 
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Douglas J. Parry, Esq. (#2531) 
PARRY MURRAY WARD & CANNON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff EADAC 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3434 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FEDERAL LEASING, INC., and 
EADAC, a partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
UTAH MANAGEMENT AND 
INVESTMENTS, INC., a UTAH 
corporation; et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 910903217 CV 
Judge Michael K. Burton 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of 
Settlement and Entry of Bar Order ("Motion"); the motion having been argued in open 
court at 10:30 a.m. on Thursday, December 23, 1993, appearances having been made 
by Doulas J. Parry and David M. McGrath for Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras and 
Manivest Corporationlpaul T. Moxley for Defendants and David H. Day for Wendell Lewis 
9 % 
% 
Butcher and Federal Leasing, Inc.; and the Court being fully advised in the premises and 
for good cause shown, makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. On April 22, 1991 EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras and 
Manivest Corporation (together the "Plaintiffs") entered into an agreement ("Agreement") 
with Wendell Lewis Butcher ("Butcher") and Federal Leasing, Inc. ("Federal Leasing"). 
2. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Butcher and Federal Leasing 
were to assume responsibility for refinancing, renovating, managing, maintaining and 
liquidating certain properties formerly held by Plaintiffs (the "Properties"). 
3. In exchange for their services, Butcher and Federal Leasing were to 
receive 50% of the net proceeds upon final liquidation and accounting pertaining to the 
Properties. 
4. One of the Properties identified in the Agreement was the Kingsley 
Park Apartments, located in Dallas, Texas ("the Kingsley Property"). 
5. Upon contracting to sell the Kingsley Property, a dispute arose 
between Plaintiffs and Butcher/Federal Leasing as to the enforceability of the Agreement. 
As a consequence, EADAC filed an action against Federal Leasing and Butcher in the 
District Court of Dallas County, Texas, Case No. 92-7821 -H (the "Texas Case"). 
6. By means of a Final Summary Judgment, the Texas Case court 
granted Plaintiffs declaratory relief, ruling that the Agreement was "executory in nature," 
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and that Butcher and Federal Leasing had no rights thereunder due to the fact that 
neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing had performed thereunder. 
7. Subsequent to execution of the Agreement, Butcher and Federal 
Leasing filed for relief under the federal bankruptcy laws ("Bankruptcy Cases"). 
8. By Stipulation dated November 10, 1993, Butcher and Federal 
Leasing stipulated with EADAC and Earnest and Angela Psarras that the Agreement is an 
executory contract and they rejected it pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365. 
9. The Bankruptcy Cases were ordered dismissed from the bench of the 
Bankruptcy Court on Monday, December 20, 1993. Pursuant to this Stipulation, the 
Bankruptcy Court entered an Order Rejecting Executory Contract. 
10. On Tuesday, December 21, 1993 written notice was provided to 
Butcher and Federal Leasing of a December 23, 1993 Order to Show Cause hearing, 
which, by stipulation of the parties was subsequently continued. On Wednesday, 
December 22, Butcher and Federal Leasing were given further written notice of the 
December 23, 1993 hearing and of Plaintiffs' Motion. Furthermore, despite having left 
messages with Butcher's and Federal Leasing's counsel of the Motion and upcoming 
hearing beginning on Monday, December 20, 1993, their counsel refused or otherwise 
failed to return Plaintiffs' counsel's call until after the hearing. Butcher and Federal 
Leasing received actual and adequate notice of the hearing at least 2 days prior to the 
December 23, 1993 hearing. 
11. Service of Plaintiffs' Motion and Notice of Hearing was not required 
upon Butcher and Federal Leasing because the Agreement was null and void as a result 
of the Final Summary Judgement in the Texas Case and the Stipulation and Order 
rejecting the Agreement, therefore leaving Butcher and Federal Leasing without rights and 
claims thereunder, including all claims set forth in this action. 
12. At the December 23, 1993 Hearing, the Court granted Butcher and 
Federal Leasing until noon on Monday, December 27 to provide the Court with a written 
response to Plaintiffs1 Motion. Neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing have filed any such 
written response. 
13. The following parties to this action are desirous of entering into an 
agreement as a means of resolving and settling all claims hereunder ("Settlement 
Agreement"): EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras, Con Psarras, Con Psarras as 
guardian for the minor, Katherine Psarras, Anthony Psarras, Daniel Psarras, Utah 
Management & Investment, Inc., the Manivest Liquidating Trust, Swen Mortenson, Larry 
K. Leeper, Herbert A. Meistreich, Phillip M. McLaughlin, Michael M. Tulman, Elliot Wolfe 
and Stephen Wyatt (collectively, the "Settling Parties"). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. As a result of the Final Summary Judgment rendered in the Texas 
Case, Butcher and Federal Leasing are collaterally estopped from asserting rights or 
claims against any party to this action. 
2. Butcher's and Federal Leasing's rejection of the Agreement in the 
Bankruptcy Court proceeding operated as a matter of law to terminate the Agreement. 
Consequently, Butcher and Federal Leasing relinquished and waived any and all rights 
which they may have had under the Agreement when they rejected the Agreen ant. 
3. Butcher's and Federal Leasing's claims in this lawsuit, if any, are 
wholly contingent upon the terms of the Agreement. 
4. Because Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under the 
Agreement, they likewise have no rights in this lawsuit. 
5. Because Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under the 
Agreement or in this lawsuit, they were not entitled to notice of Plaintiffs Motion and of the 
December 23, 1993 hearing (notwithstanding that actual and adequate notice was 
nonetheless provided them). 
6. Neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing are necessary parties to any 
settlement agreement which has been or will be reached in this lawsuit. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The Settlement Agreement by and between the Settling Parties will 
terminate this action with prejudice as to all parties. 
2. Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under any settlment 
agreement entered into by and between the Settling Parties, other than as expressly set 
forth therein. 
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3. Butcher and Federal Leasing and their heirs, assigns, predecessors, 
and successors in intersts are barred from asserting against any party to this lawsuit, any 
right or claim contained in the pleadings of this lawsuit and any right or claim which is or 
will be settled pursuant to a settlement agreement by and between the Settling Parties. 
DATED this ^ / d a y of December 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
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PARRY MURRAY WARD & CANNON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff EADAC 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3434 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FEDERAL LEASING, INC., and \ 
EADAC, a partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UTAH MANAGEMENT AND INVESTMENTS, INC., a UTAH 
corporation; et al., 
Defendants. 
AMENDED ORDER 
Civil No. 910903217 CV 
Judge Michael K. Burton 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of 
Settlement and Entry of Bar Order ("Motion"); the motion having been argued in open 
court at 10:30 a.m. on Thursday, December 23,1993, appearances having been made 
by Douglas J. Parry and David M. McGrath for EADAC, Ernest Psarras and Angela 
Psarras, Paul T. Moxley for Defendants and David H. Day for Wendell Lewis Butcher and 
Federal Leasing, Inc.; and the Court being fully advised in the premises and for good 
cause shown, makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. On April 22, 1991 EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras and 
Manivest Corporation (together the "Plaintiffs") entered into an agreement ("Agreement") 
with Wendell Lewis Butcher ("Butcher") and Federal Leasing, Inc. ("Federal Leasing"). 
2. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Butcher and Federal Leasing 
were to assume responsibility for refinancing, renovating, managing, maintaining and 
liquidating certain properties formerly held by Plaintiffs (the "Properties"). 
3. In exchange for their services, Butcher and Federal Leasing were to 
receive 50% of the net proceeds upon final liquidation and accounting pertaining to the 
Properties. 
4. One of the Properties identified in the Agreement was the Kingsley 
Park Apartments, located in Dallas, Texas (the Kingsley Property"). 
5. Upon contracting to sell the Kingsley Property, a dispute arose 
between Plaintiffs and Butcher/Federal Leasing as to the enforceability of the Agreement. 
As a consequence, EADAC filed an action against Federal Leasing and Butcher in the 
District Court of Dallas County, Texas, Case No. 92-7821-H (the 'Texas Case"). 
6. By means of a Final Summary Judgment, the Texas Case court 
granted Plaintiffs declaratory relief, ruling that the Agreement was "executory in nature," 
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and that Butcher and Federal Leasing had no rights thereunder due to the fact that 
neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing had performed thereunder. 
7. Subsequent to execution of the Agreement, Butcher and Federal 
Leasing filed for relief under the federal bankruptcy laws ("Bankruptcy Cases"). 
8. By Stipulation dated November 10, 1993, Butcher and Federal 
Leasing stipulated with EADAC and Earnest and Angela Psarras that the Agreement is an 
executory contract and they rejected it pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365. 
9. The Bankruptcy Cases were ordered dismissed from the bench of the 
Bankruptcy Court on Monday, December 20, 1993. Pursuant to this Stipulation, the 
Bankruptcy Court entered an Order Rejecting Executory Contract. 
10. On Tuesday, December 21, 1993 written notice was provided to 
Butcher and Federal Leasing of a December 23, 1993 Order to Show Cause hearing, 
which, by stipulation of the parties was subsequently continued. On Wednesday, 
December 22, Butcher and Federal Leasing were given further written notice of the 
December 23, 1993 hearing and of Plaintiffs' Motion. Furthermore, despite having left 
messages with Butcher's and Federal Leasing's counsel of the Motion and upcoming 
hearing beginning on Monday, December 20, 1993, their counsel refused or otherwise 
failed to return Plaintiffs' counsel's call until after the hearing. Butcher and Federal 
Leasing received actual and adequate notice of the hearing at least 2 days prior to the 
December 23,1993 hearing. 
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11. Service of Plaintiffs' Motion and Notice of Hearing was not required 
upon Butcher and Federal Leasing because the Agreement was null and void as a result 
of the Final Summary Judgement in the Texas Case and the Stipulation and Order 
rejecting the Agreement, therefore leaving Butcher and Federal Leasing without rights and 
claims thereunder, including all claims set forth in this action. 
12. At the December 23, 1993 Hearing, the Court granted Butcher and 
Federal Leasing until noon on Monday, December 27 to provide the Court with a written 
response to Plaintiffs' Motion. Neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing have filed any such 
written response. 
13. The following parties to this action are desirous of entering into an 
agreement as a means of resolving and settling all claims hereunder ("Settlement 
Agreement"): EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras, Con Psarras, Con Psarras as 
guardian for the minor, Katherine Psarras, Anthony Psarras, Daniel Psarras, Utah 
Management & Investment, Inc., the Manivest Liquidating Trust, Swen Mortenson, Larry 
K. Leeper, Herbert A. Meistreich, Phillip M. McLaughlin, Michael M. Tulman, Elliot Wolfe 
and Stephen Wyatt (collectively, the "Settling Parties"). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. As a result of the Final Summary Judgment rendered in the Texas 
Case, Butcher and Federal Leasing are collaterally estopped from asserting against any 
party to this action any rights or claims arising out of the substance of this litigation. 
2. Butcher's and Federal Leasing's rejection of the Agreement in the 
Bankruptcy Court proceeding operated as a matter of law to terminate the Agreement. 
3. Butcher's and Federal Leasing's claims in this lawsuit, if any, are 
wholly contingent upon the terms of the Agreement. 
4. Because Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under the 
Agreement, they likewise have no rights in this lawsuit. 
5. Because Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under the 
Agreement or in this lawsuit, they were not entitled to notice of Plaintiffs Motion and of the 
December 23, 1993 hearing (notwithstanding that actual and adequate notice was 
nonetheless provided them). 
6. Neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing are necessary parties to any 
settlement agreement which has been or will be reached in this lawsuit. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The Settlement Agreement by and between the Settling Parties will 
terminate this action with prejudice as to all parties. 
2. Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under any settlement 
agreement entered into by and between the Settling Parties, other than as expressly set 
forth therein. 
3. Butcher and Federal Leasing and their heirs, assigns, predecessors, 
and successors in interests are barred from asserting against any party to this lawsuit, 
any right or claim contained in the pleadings of this lawsuit. 
DATED this day of December 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE MICHAEL K. BURTON 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
PAUL T. MOXLEY, Attorney for Defenc ;s 
Tab 3 
Douglas J. Parry, Esq. (#2531) 
David M. McGrath, Esq. (#6276) 
PARRY MURRAY WARD & CANNON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff EADAC 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3434 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FEDERAL LEASING, INC., and 
EADAC, a partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
UTAH MANAGEMENT AND 
INVESTMENTS, INC., a UTAH 
corporation; et al., 
Defendants. 
SECOND AMENDED ORDER 
Civil No. 910903217 CV 
Judge Michael K. Burton 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Approval of 
Settlement and Entry of Bar Order ("Motion"); the motion having been argued in open 
court at 10:30 a.m. on Thursday, December 23, 1993, appearances having been made 
by Douglas J. Parry and David M. McGrath for EADAC, Ernest Psarras and Angela 
Psarras, Paul T. Moxley for Defendants and David H. Day for Wendell Lewis Butcher and 
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Federal Leasing, Inc.; and the Court being fully advised in the premises and for good 
cause shown, makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. On April 22, 1991 EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras and 
Manivest Corporation (together the "Plaintiffs'') entered into an agreement ("Agreement") 
with Wendell Lewis Butcher ("Butcher") and Federal Leasing, Inc. ("Federal Leasing"). 
2. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Butcher and Federal Leasing 
were to assume responsibility for refinancing, renovating, managing, maintaining and 
liquidating certain properties formerly held by Plaintiffs (the "Properties"). 
3. In exchange for their services, Butcher and Federal Leasing were to 
receive 50% of the net proceeds upon final liquidation and accounting pertaining to the 
Properties. 
4. One of the Properties identified in the Agreement was the Wngsley 
Park Apartments, located in Dallas, Texas ("the Wngsley Property"). 
5. Upon contracting to sell the Wngsley Property, a dispute arose 
between Plaintiffs and Butcher/Federal Leasing as to the enforceability of the Agreement 
As a consequence, EADAC filed an action against Federal Leasing and Butcher in the 
District Court of Dallas County, Texas, Case No. 92-7821-H (the Texas Case"). 
6. By means of a Final Summary Judgment the Texas Case court 
granted Plaintiffs declaratory relief, ruling that the Agreement was "executory in nature," 
-2-
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and that Butcher and Federal Leasing had no rights thereunder due to the fact that 
neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing had performed thereunder. 
7. Subsequent to execution of the Agreement, Butcher and Federal 
Leasing filed for relief under the federal bankruptcy laws ("Bankruptcy Cases"). 
8. By Stipulation dated November 10, 1993, Butcher and Federal 
Leasing stipulated with EADAC and Earnest and Angela Psarras that the Agreement is an 
executory contract and they rejected it pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365. Pursuant to this 
Stipulation, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order Rejecting Executory Contract. 
9. The Bankruptcy Cases were ordered dismissed from the bench by 
the Bankruptcy Court on Monday, December 20, 1993. 
10. On Tuesday, December 21, 1993 written notice was provided to 
Butcher and Federal Leasing of a December 23, 1993 Order to Show Cause hearing, 
which, by stipulation of the parties was subsequentiy continued. On Wednesday, 
December 22, Butcher and Federal Leasing were given further written notice of the 
December 23, 1993 hearing and of Plaintiffs' Motion. Furthermore, despite having left 
messages with Butcher's and Federal Leasing's counsel of the Motion and upcoming 
hearing beginning on Monday, December 20, 1993, their counsel refused or otherwise 
failed to return Plaintiffs' counsel's call until after the hearing. Butcher and Federal 
Leasing received actual and adequate notice of the hearing at least 2 days prior to the 
December 23, 1993 hearing. 
-3-
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11. Service of Plaintiffs' Motion and Notice of Hearing was not required 
upon Butcher and Federal Leasing because the Agreement was null and void as a result 
of the Final Summary Judgement in the Texas Case and the Stipulation and Order 
rejecting the Agreement, therefore leaving Butcher and Federal Leasing without rights and 
claims thereunder, including all claims set forth in this action. 
12. At the December 23, 1993 Hearing, the Court granted Butcher and 
Federal Leasing until noon on Monday, December 27 to provide the Court with a written 
response to Plaintiffs' Motion. Neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing have filed any such 
written response. 
13. The following parties to this action are desirous of entering into an 
agreement as a means of resolving and settling all claims hereunder ("Settlement 
Agreement"): EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras, Con Psarras, Con Psarras as 
guardian for the minor, Katherine Psarras, Anthony Psarras, Daniel Psarras, Utah 
Management & Investment, Inc., the Manivest Liquidating Trust, Swen Mortenson, Larry 
K. Leeper, Herbert A. Meistreich, Phillip M. McLaughlin, Michael M. Tuiman, Elliot Wolfe 
and Stephen Wyatt (collectively, the "Settling Parties"). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. As a result of the Final Summary Judgment rendered in the Texas 
Case, Butcher and Federal Leasing are collaterally estopped from asserting against any 




2. Butcher's and Federal Leasing's rejection of the Agreement in the 
Bankruptcy Court proceeding operated as a matter of law to terminate the Agreement 
3. Butcher's and Federal Leasing's claims in this lawsuit, if any, are 
wholly contingent upon the terms of the Agreement 
4. Because Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under the 
Agreement, they likewise have no rights in this lawsuit. 
5. Because Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights under the 
Agreement or in this lawsuit, they were not entitled to notice of Plaintiffs Motion and of the 
December 23, 1993 hearing (notwithstanding that actual and adequate notice was 
nonetheless provided them). 
6. Neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing are necessary parties to any 
settlement agreement which has been or will be reached in this lawsuit 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The settlement agreement by and between the Settling Parties will 
terminate this action with prejudice as to all parties. 
2. Whereas, Butcher and Federal Leasing's rights in the law suit were 
terminated and whereas they are not parties to the Settlement Agreement, except as 
expressly set forth therein, the Settlement Agreement does not create or confer upon 
Butcher or Federal Leasing any rights therein. However, this paragraph does not affect 
^ 0 
the rights Federal Leasing or Butcher may have to the 
pursuant to some other agreement 
proceeds of the settlement 
***4 r?~-i 1 
*wmt*m* uiuii 11 LUI iiuii ILIW 
DATED this ^ T day of Januuy IQ, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 




This agreement made in Salt Lake City, Utah, on this 22nd day 
of April, 1991 by and between EADAC, a Utah Partnership, 
Em&a-t Psarras, Angela Psarras and Manivest Corporation, 
hereinafter collectively referred to as Owners and Federal 
Leasing Inc., a Utah Corporation and Lewis Butcher 
hereinafter collectively referred to as Developer. 
WITNESSETH: 
PARTIES RECITE: 
1. Owners own certain properties, contracts and cash 
flow which holdings have been* assigned to Manivest 
Liquidating Trust: • 
2. The properties and contracts now known which were 
transferred to the said Manivest Trust: by Owners are 
set: forth as Exhibit (A) annexed hereto• The. said 
properties and any other properties hereafter agreed 
by: the parties hereto-be included in this joint 
venture will be handled, managed and disposed of as 
set: forth below. 
3* The said properties have been mismanaged, foreclosed 
upon or generally, devalued* In order to protect the 
remaining values of the properties, assigned to 
Manivest Liquidating Trust and to recoup from those 
responsible, damages suffered by the properties, the 
parties hereto intend to, upon consultation among 
themselves, institute legal action against the 




Trust and -the management company hired by the said 
Trust. 
4. The Owners desire the Developer to assume full 
responsibility of refinancing, renovating, -managing, 
maintaining and liquidating the said properties to 
the best of their abilities. 
5. In connection with the activities said forth in 
paragraph 4 above. Lewis Butchers states that he has 
an interest in Carnicero Dynasty, a Colorado 
Corporation and will use his best efforts to affect 
the hypothecation of securities controlled by said 
Carnicero. Securities to he used as a reserve account 
for any loan where such a reserve is required by a 
lender for any loan* Developer may need these 
Securities from time to time to secure or refinance 
the said properties. It is expressly understood that 
Carnicero will be paid a tee upon the refinancing or 
sale of each property handled, which fee shall be 
paid out of escrow of the particular property. 
6. Owners-own 2 condominiums in Coronado,. California 
which condominiums were wrongfully mortgaged by the 
said Trust to First Security Bank of Utah for 
approximately $800,000.00 and which properties the 
owners want back in their former condition. 
7. .Ernest Psarras has at .present a Deficiency Judgement. 
against him~in sum of $2,000,000.00 and wishes this 





8. Richard Bigl'er, not a party to this agreement, 
brought the parties together and parties agree that 
said Bigler is entitled to a finders fee for his 
efforts. 
Parties agree: 
a. The Owners will assign all of their, rights, title and 
interest in the said contracts and properties to 
Owners and Developer as tenants in common. 
b. Any cash generated from the sale or refinancing of 
the properties shall be distributed on the 10th day 
of each and every month as follows: 
1. Any outstanding liens upon the properties 
brought current to date. 
2. Repay to Developer any costs and expenses 
incurred in the management, operation and 
liquidating of the said paper and 
properties hereunder* 
3* Sufficient cash to pay amount due on a 
Master Charge card to be obtained by the 
• ? _ 
r^ - t o be used by him f o r j o i n t - v e n t u r e 
y bus ines s re lated c o s t s . 
4 . Upon the recovery by t h e Developer of the 
p r o p e r t i e s , contracts and c a s h f low, and 
t h e money being s u f f i c i e n t t o pay a l l 
j o i n t venture i n the name o f Lewis Butcher, 
payments , mortgages and overhead expenses Of. 
of operating, this joint-venture shall pay 
64 
3 
to-EADAC Investments, for properties 
previously placed in Manivest Liquidating 
Trust, the sum of 312,500.00 per month for 
a 3 year period or until all such 
properties and contracts are sold or 
liquidated, which ever comes first. 
5. At the closing of each escrow sale or 
refinancing made by Developer through the 
services of Caraicero, Carnicero shall be 
paid a fee "up front". 
C. This agreement shall be terminated one month 
following the final completed liquidation of the 
contracts and properties which have time to time been 
brought in by this agreement. 
D. The amount of a finders fee for Richard Blgler shall 
be determined by-Ernest psarras and the said amount 
will be subject* to -approval *by Lewis Butcher* 
E. The parties will cooperate in the execution of all 
Instruments necessary to refinance, mortgage or sell 
any or all of the properties where it is deemed 
necessary by Developer for the refinancing, 
reconstruction# management and general maintenance of 
any or all of the properties* 
F* All parties will cooperate in the bringing of any or 
all partnerships, now being managed by Manivest 




G. Upon the final liquidation and accounting under this 
agreement the Owners-and Developer shall each receive 
50% of the net proceeds less direct costs incurred in 
maintenance of the properties. 
H. Developer shall be reimbursed for all costs and 
expenses incurred by Developer in ascertaining 
the history of the properties. This includes all 
contracts now controlled or having herebefore been 
sold or disposed of by Manivest Liquidating Trust. 
IN WITNESS HEREOF the parties hereto have set their hands and 




Gener al< ralOpar-Cner 
atiM**" 
/Zu^**' L.Kg,, fr&t*-'* 
^Ernest Psarras, Individually 
AngeJ/a Psarras, individually 
DEVELOPER 
Federal Leasing, Inc. 
vidually 
Manivest Corporation 





CLIST OF PROPERTIES) 
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ALTOONA PARKWAY (DALLAS, TEX) 252 UNITS 
AMERADA (DALLAS, TX) 
AMESBURY 
AVENUE PLAZA 
•BONNEVILLA APARTMENTS (OGDEN, UTAH) 
BONNEVILLE MANOR APARTMENTS (BOUNTIFUL, UTAH) 
BRASS LAMP (RICLAND, WASH) 28 UNITS 
CAESAR'S PALACE APARTMENTS <RENO, NEVADA) 
CARRIAGE HILL OFFIC BLDG. (SLC, UT) 
CASA DEA/CASA LINDA (PROVO, UT) 
CASA NUEVA APARTMENTS (DALLAS, TEXAS) 176 UNIT 
CENTRAL BANK BLDG.OF CHAPEL HILLS (COLO SPRINGS, COLO) 
CENTRAL BANK OF COLORADO SPRINGS 
CHAPARRAL (CARSON CITY, NEV) 22 UNIT 
CITY CENTER (SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH) 
CITY CENTRAL MOTEL (SALT. LAKE CITY, UT) 
CORONADO ( # 1 0 4 ) (CORONADO, CALIFORNIA) 5 CONDOMINIUMS 
ORONADO ( # 1 1 0 4 ) 
CORONADO ( # 1 1 0 6 ) 
CORONADO ( # 1 4 0 4 ) 
CORONADO ( # 1 5 0 3 ) 
CORONADO ( # 1 6 0 5 ) 
CORONADO SHORES 
CREEKSIDE (RICHLAND, WASH) 88 UNIT 
CROWN APARTMENTS (WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH) 
CROWN 
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ELDGES NURSING HOME (RENO, NEVADA) 
ELGES HOSPITAL 
ELDORADO 1 & 2 (RICHLAND, WASH) 44 UNITS 
GLENDALE SHADOWS (GLENDALE, ARIZONA) 138 UNIT 
GLENDALE SHADOWS (PHOENIX, ARIZ) 138 UNITS 
LENHOLLOW (HERITAGE) (ARLINGTON, TEX) 
GRAND RIDGE N/R 
HERITAGE VILLAGE 
HILLCREST (RENO, NEV.) 58 UNITS 
HOLLADAY HILLS (SLC, UT) 70 UNIT 
HOLLADAY HILLS COMM LAND (SLC, UTAH) 
ILLAHEE (RICHLAND, WASH) 83 UNIT 
ISLAND BEACH CLUB 
JADWIN PROF. BLDG. (RICHLAND, WASH) 
KEARNS LANES BOWLING' ALLEY (SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH) 
KINGSLEY PARK APARTUENTS (DALLAS, TX) 276 UNIT 
MANSION ARMS (CARSON CITY, NEV) 
MARK. IV & COMMERCIAL (SLC, UT) 38 UNIT 
(2 COMMERCIAL UNITS) 
MARINA DEL REY (GRAPEVINE, TX) 225 UNIT 
MEGABAR BUILDING (NORTH OGDEN, UTAH) COMMERCIAL BUILDING 
MT EYRIE APARTMENTS (OGDEN, UTAH) 
MURRAY MANOR (RENO, NEVADA) 46 UNIT 
NORTHPOINT (RICHLAND, WASHINGTON) 84- UNITS 
OLYMPUS APT (DALLAS, TEX) 
OUTRIGGER/MURPHY APARTMENTS (RENO, NEVADA) 
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OUTRIGGER/MURPHY 
PINECREEK (HOUSTON, TX) 300 UNIT 
REDWOOD SHADOWS (SLC, OT) 126 UNIT 




ROLLINGWOOD (HOUSTON , TX) 211 UNIT 
ROSEHAVEN APT (SLC, UT) 45 UNIT 
SANIBEL HERITAGE VILLAGE 
SANIBEL ISLAND (2 CONDOMINIUMS SANIBEL ISLAND, EL) 
SIERRA GRV/BERGIN GARDENS (RENO, NEV) 48 UNIT 
SHIELDS 
SOUTH CIRCLE 
SOUTH LAKE SHOPPING MALL (MURRAY, UT) 
SOUTHERN GARDENS (DENVER, COLO) 
SOUTHWESTERN N/R 
SUNDOWN EAST 
SUNDOWN WEST APARTMENTS (SALT LAKE CITY,"UTAH) 
SUNRISE VILLA 
TAPTEAL (RICHLAND, WASH) 98 UNIT 
TKUBDERHILLS 
TIMBERS (RICHLAND, WASH) 267 UNIT 
TOWNHOUSE APT (CARSON CITY, NEV) 26 UNIT 
TRAILS (IRVING, TX) 
TRI CITIES N/R 
TWIN CEDARS APARTMENTS (SEATTLE, WASHINGTON) 
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TWIN CEDARS 
VILLA CALMA (OGDEN, UT) 
VILLAGE OF GRANDRIDGE (KENNEWICK, WASH) 214 UNITS 
WILDWOOD (PHOENIX, ARIZ) 
WINDGATE (BOUNTIFUL, UTAH) 100 UNITS 
WOODCREEK APT. (BAYTOWN, TX) 301 UNITS 
WOODHOLLOW I 
WOODHOLLOW II (BAYTOWN, TEX) 72 UNITS (2 STORY OFFICE) 
WOODHOLLOW III 
WOODHOLLOW IV (BAYTOWON, TEX) 76 UNITS 
WOODHOLLOW V (BAYTOWN, TX) 246 UNITS 
WOODHOLLOW VI (BAYTOWN, TX) 220 UNIT 
WOODLAND PARK (ARLINGTON, TX) 
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ADDENDUM 
This addendum to EADAC Investment, Manivest Corporation, 
and Federal Leasing, Inc. and Lewis Butcher is made to 
clarify certain points in the said agreement. 
1. In reference to page 2 paragraph 4, the following 
should be added. 
The owners desire the Developer to also assume the 
position of general manager and to conduct the day to 
day business of EADAC Investment and Manivest 
Corporation• 
2. In reference to page 3 under the heading of "Parties. 
Agree" paragraph •a* the following is added. 
Owners also intended to assign all of their stock in 
Manivest Corporation to the Venture Agreement, as stated 
in the Minutes of the May 13, 1991, Manivest Corporation 
meeting. 
Dated this 28 day of June, 1991. 
OWNERS DEVELOPER 
EADAC, a Limited Partnership Federal Leasing, Inc. 
Lfewis Butc&irV- individually 
Ernest Psarras, individually 
Manivest Corporation 
By sZZmc-^ i YJ/?A&t.~y 
Ernest Psarras, President 
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SECOND ADDENDUM 
This is the Second Addendum to the Agreement made in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 22, 1991 by and between EADAC, 
a Partnership, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras, and Manivest 
Corporation as parties referred to collectively as "Owners* 
and Federal Leasing, Inc. and Lewis Butcher as parties 
referred to collectively, as 'Developer* • 
In reference to page 3- under the heading of "Parties 
agree*, paragraph a, the following is added a£ter the 
paragraph added in the "Addendum* on said Agreement: 
a* Owners intended to assign to the venture created by 
the said Agreement, all of their Common Stock in any non-
active corporation such as but not limited to Piezo 
Instruments, Inc., Olympus M.T.M. Corp., and any other 
corporate stock in any other inactive corporation which may 
be hereafter discovered and Owners do hereby assign the same 
to the said Venture. 
Owners further intended to assign to the said Venture 
all of their rights under any executory contract held by 
them, said rights to be managed, handled, and disposed of 
thereunder in the sole discretion of the Developer; Owners do 
hereby assign said rights to the said Venture Agreement« 
Dated this 19 day of July, .1991, 
OWNERS 
EADAC, a Limited Partnership 
Bv Qj^JfJ k YAAJ^LC^ 
General (Partner 
Angela Psarras, individually 
Ernest Psarras, individually 
Manivest Corpor; 
DEVELOPER 





CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURTS 
CAUSE NO. 9 2 - 7 8 2 1 - H 
EADAC INVESTMENT COMPANY, S IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
A Utah Limited Partnership, § 
ANGELA M. PSARRAS S 
and ERNEST PSARRAS, S 
Plaintiffs S 
S 
VS. S OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS 
s 
CARNICERO DYNASTY CORPORATION, S 
A Colorado Corporation, S 
FEDERAL LEASING, INC., and LEWIS S 
BUTCHER, S 
Defendants S 160TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ^50 H ? ^ 
CAME ON TO BE HEARD the Motion of Plaintiffsf Eadac Investment 
Company, Angela M. Psarras and Ernest Psarras, for a Summary Judgment 
against Defendants, Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, Federal Leasing, Inc. 
and Lewis Butcher. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and the 
summary judgment evidence, and after hearing argument of Plaintiffs' 
counsel, finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to a Final Summary Judgment 
against Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, Federal Leasing, Inc. and Lewis 
Butcher with respect to the Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief 
pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, § 37.001, et seq. of 
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Accordingly, the Court 
hereby orders and decrees the following declaratory relief: 
A. The April 22, 1991, agreement between Plaintiffs, Eadac 
Investment Company, Angela M. Psarras and Ernest Psarras, and Defendants 
Federal Leasing, Inc. and Lewis Butcher (the "Agreement-), a copy of 
which is attached to this Order as Exhibit "A", is executory in nature 
and Defendants, Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, Federal Leasing, Inc. and 
Lewis Butcher, have no rights, legal or equitable to the following 
described real property situated in Dallas County, Texas: 
FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1 
psab03 .002 EXHIBIT "B" 
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BEING ALL of Lot One, Block 8118 of the City of Dallas, Dallas 
County, Texas, being also known as the WENCO ADDITION, as 
recorded in Volume 68143, Page 2113 of the Deed Records of 
Dallas County, Texas, and commonly known as the Kingsley Park 
North Apartments (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"). 
B. The Notice of Interest in Real Property, a copy of which is 
attached to this Order as Exhibit "BM is a cloud upon Plaintiff Badac 
Investment Company's title to the Property and does not create any 
interest in the Property in any of the Defendants. 
C. Any and all liens against the Property which are purportedly 
held by Defendant Carnicero Dynasty Corporation by virtue of an 
assignment from The Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, or otherwise, 
are void. 
D. The Agreement does not provide, by itself or by reference to 
some other existing writing, sufficient data or other means by which the 
Property to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty. As 
a result, the Agreement is unenforceable as failing to satisfy the 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 
E. Plaintiff Eadac Investment Company is the fee simple owner of 
the Property. It is, further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that Plaintiffs, Eadac 
Investment Company, Angela M. Psarras and Ernest Psarras, have and 
recover of and from Defendants, Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, Federal 
Leasing, Inc. and Lewis Butcher, jointly and severally, reasonable 
attorneys' fees in the amount of Forty Thousand and no/100 Dollars 
($40,000.00). In the event of an appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals, 
Plaintiffs are awarded an additional Five Thousand and no/100 Dollars 
($5,000.00) as reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees. In the event 
of a filing of an application for Writ of Error in the Supreme Court, 
Plaintiffs are awarded and additional Five Thousand and no/100 Dollars Jrwtf 
FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2 77 "/C/pS 
p s a b 0 3 . 0 0 2 
H5,UUU.UU) aa reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees. In the event 
the Supreme Court either grants or refuses to grant Writ of Error, 
Plaintiffs are awarded an additional Three Thousand Five Hundred and 
no/100 Dollars ($3f500.00) as reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees. 
It is, further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that Plaintiffs, Eadac 
Investment Company, Angela M. Psarras and Ernest Psarras, recover post-
judgment interest on all amounts at the rate of ten percent (10%) per 
annum from date of judgment until paid, and costs of court, for all of 
which let execution issue. 
All other relief not expressly granted herein is denied. 
SIGNED this s^ Sth day of March, 1993, 
"?H JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS 




To: Stevs Tycktsn Pros: Ktwin Anderson 11-19-93 l:24pi p. 2 of 4 
Kevin It Anderson (4786) 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
50 West Broadway, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7090 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
-ooOoo— 
Bankruptcy No. 93C-21748 
Bankruptcy No- 93021924 
(Consolidated Chapter 11) 
In re 
FEDERAL LEASING CORPORATION 




EADAC Investment Company and Ernest and Angela Psarras (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "Psarrases") and Wendell Butcher and Federal Leasing Corporation 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Butcher") (Psarrases and Butcher are hereinafter 
collectively referred to as a "Party" or the Parties") hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 
RECITALS 
1. On or about April 22, 1991, Psarrases entered into an agreement with Federal 
Leasing (the "Agreement1'). A copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," 
2. The Parties acknowledge that each Party asserts that the other Party has 
defaulted and breached the terms of the Agreement and that such alleged defaults and 
breaches make it impossible for Butcher to assume the Agreement under 11 U.S.C. § 365. 
3. The Parties acknowledge that each Party asserts claims against the other Party 
arising out of the alleged defaults and breaches of the Agreement and that the Parties 
mutually dispute each other's claims. 
3. On July 26, 1993, Psarrases filed a their Motion To Compel Assumption Or 
Slave Tycksen Froi: Kevin Andtrson 11-19-93 l;24pn p. 
Rejection Of Executory Contract (the "Motion"). The Motion was set for a hearing on 
November 10,1993, at 3:00 p.m. 
4. To save both sides the time and expense of conducting a full hearing on the 
Motion, the parlies hereby stipulate as follows. 
STIPULATION 
A. The Agreement is an executory contract that is rejected pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 365, effective November 10,1993. 
DATED this /flfl/day of November, 1993. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
KEVWR-ANDBRSON 
ATTORNEY FOR. PS ARRASES 
DATED this J&_ day of November, 1993. 
DAY AND BARNEY 
STEVEN C. TYCKSEN 
ATTORNEY FOR FEDERAL LEASING 
DATED this A _ day of November, 1993. 
WENDBtL BUTCHER 
PRO SE DEBTOR 
Tab 7 
ORDER PREPARED BY: 
Kevin R. Anderson (4786) 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
50 West Broadway, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7090 
V 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRL . . o i f COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
—ooOoo-
Bankruptcy No. 93C-21748 
Bankruptcy No. 93C-21924 
(Consolidated Chapter 11) hire 
FEDERAL LEASING CORPORATION 
and WENDELL LEWIS BUTCHER, 
Debtors. 
—ooOoo« 
ORDER REJECTING EXECUTORY CONTRACT 
Pursuant to the written stipulation among EADAC Investment Company, Ernest and 
Angela Psarras, Wendell Butcher, pro se> and Federal Leasing Corporation, and for other 
good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the agreement among the parties dated April 22, 1991, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference, is rejected 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365, effective November 10,1993. 
DATED t h i s ^ Z ^ y of November. 1993. 
JO PARTIES rW-
BY THE COURT: 
MM / •' 
GLENE. 
UNTIED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE 
tim DEPUTY CLERK 
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Steven C. Tycksen, of counsel (3300) 
David H. Day (3 610) 
DAY & BARNEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-6800 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FEDERAL LEASING, INC., and 
EADAC, a partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH MANAGEMENT AND 
INVESTMENTS, INC., a UTAH 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 910903217 CV 
Judge Michael K. Burton 
A hearing concerning an objection to the order and amended order 
and motion to amend filed on behalf of Federal Leasing, Inc., and 
Wendell Lewis Butcher came on for hearing before the above entitled 
court on Friday, the 14th day of January, 1994 at the hour of 10:00 
a.m. pursuant to notice. Mr. Steven C. Tycksen, of counsel, of the 
firm of Day & Barney and Mr. David H. Day of Day & Barney appeared in 
the interest of and on behalf of Federal Leasing, Inc. and Wendell 
Lewis Butcher. Mr. Douglas J. Parry and David M. McGrath appeared 
for Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras, Manivest Corporation and EADAC. 
Mr. Paul T. Moxley appeared for Defendants. 
Whereupon, the matter having been argued to the above entitled 




arguments of counsel and being advised in the premises and having 
requested that counsel submit a proposed order for resolution of the 
issues presented in the above entitled case and the court having 
reviewed the orders as proposed by respective counsel, together with 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and otherwise being advised 
in the premises herewith enters: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The involvement of Wendell Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing, 
Inc., in the above lawsuit and their respective claims alleged in the 
pleadings arise out of an agreement dated April 22, 1991 with other 
parties in this lawsuit, which agreement by Stipulation and Order of 
the United States Bankruptcy Court, has been rejected and said 
contract has been determined by said Court to be non-executory and 
Wendell Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing, Inc. have, therefore, no 
longer any right to assert any interest or claims in the proceedings 
now pending before this court, 
2. The following parties to this action are desirous of 
entering into an agreement as a means of resolving and settling all 
claims hereunder; EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras, Con 
Psarras, Con Psarras as guardian for the minor , Katherine Psarras, 
Anthony Psarras, Daniel Psarras, Utah Management & Investment, Inc., 
the Manivest Liquidating Trust, Swen Mortenson, Larry K. Leeper, 
Herbert A. Meistreich, Phillip M. McLaughlin, Michael M. Tulman, 
Elliot Wolfe and Stephen Wyatt. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now enters 
its, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. As a result of the Stipulation and Order of the Bankruptcy 
Court rejecting the agreement of April 22, 1991, the stated agreement 
is no longer executory and as a consequence, Wendell Lewis Butcher 
and Federal Leasing, Inc. are no longer proper parties to this 
lawsuit and neither has any rights to further pursue this lawsuit nor 
is either a necessary party to any settlement which has been or will 
be reached in this lawsuit by the remaining parties, and Wendell 
Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing, Inc. should be, and have requested 
to be, dismissed as parties to this proceeding, said dismissal to be 
with prejudice as to all parties, with the rights and claims of 
Wendell Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing, Inc. against EADAC, Ernest 
Psarras and Angela Psarras, and the rights of EADAC, Ernest Psarras 
and Angela Psarras against Wendell L. Butcher and Federal Leasing, 
Inc. to be reserved. 
2. That the parties designated in Finding 2 above have the right, 
without any involvement of Wendell Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing, 
Inc. to enter into such settlement as the parties desire and upon 
such terms as are agreeable to them. 
DATED this day of January, 1994. 
Michael K Burton, Judge 
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